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MUNICIPAL STANDING IN ILLINOIS: THE
COURTS MOVE TOWARD A BROADER
PERSPECTIVE OF REVIEW FOR
LOCAL LAND USE
DECISIONS
In 1980 over 74% of the American population resided in urban and suburban areas.' By the year 2000, the population of
the Chicago metropolitan area is expected to increase by more
than 10%.2 Increases in population inevitably cause a corresponding increase in the demand for land development. But the
amount of developable land in a metropolitan area remains essentially constant. Consequently, suburban towns and villages
faced with the pressure of continuing growth must ultimately
decide where, how, and what kind Of growth will take place.
These issues present basic policy questions for local governing
bodies-questions which invariably cause controversy and conflict. This is especially true when a zoning municipality's land
use decisions result in burdens on neighboring municipalities.
Zoning is essentially a method of settling conflicts over the
most appropriate uses of land.3 Despite disagreement regarding
the specific purposes of zoning,4 it remains clear that zoning has
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (102d ed. 1981). The population of metro-

politan areas nationwide has increased by approximately 10% per year
since 1940. Id.
2. In 1980, the population of the Chicago metropolitan area was
7,103,000. The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission projects that by
the year 2000 the population of the Chicago metropolitan area will exceed

7,814,000. Interview with Mr. Max Dieber, Director of Research of the North-

eastern Illinois Planning Commission (March 2, 1983). See infra notes 11015 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission.
3. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME xvi (1966). Babcock notes that this
neutral definition of the zoning process includes the formulation, administration and judicial review of zoning decisions. Id. Such a definition is useful in clearly distinguishing the process of zoning from the theoretical
justifications for its use. The confusion of these two concepts would limit
the use of the zoning process only to the attainment of specific goals-goals
which may be theoretically invalid as well as unresponsive to local political
and environmental needs. See id. at 124-25. See also infra note 4 for a further discussion of these issues.
4. See BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 115-25. Compare Dunham, A Legal
and Economic Basisfor City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 670-71 (1958)
(goal of zoning and planning is to maximize value of property in community) and O'HARRow, PLAN TALK AND PLAIN TALK 223-27 (1981) (zoning is a

tool for implementing a comprehensive land use plan) with

BABCOCK,
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become an indispensable tool for managing urban and suburban
growth. 5 To a large extent, the increased significance of zoning
law is a result of the unprecedented suburban growth of the past
three decades. 6 But, just as the problems facing urban and suburban communities are changing, so too are the scope and char7
acter of zoning issues.
During the initial development and growth of the suburbs,
most land use conflicts centered on peculiarly intra-municipal
problems. It made little difference to a neighboring community
whether a particular business intersection was best suited for a
fast food franchise or a filling station; or whether a zoning municipality restricted construction to a specific style of architecsupra note 3, at 115-25 (property value theory of zoning is too restrictive
and parochial; planning theory restricts use of zoning process to fulfillment
of comprehensive plan which may have defects) and Harr, Regionalism and
Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 523 (1957) (realistically assessing the value of regional planning). For a useful overview of the
law of zoning see generally Kratovil, Zoning: A New Look, 11 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 433 (1977).

5. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the
United States Supreme Court reflected on the modern necessity for comprehensive zoning laws, Justice Sutherland stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the
great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue
to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation
of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so ap-

parent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even
half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex condi-

tions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and
unreasonable ....

In a changing world, it is impossible that it should

be otherwise.
Id. at 386-87. All 50 states have enacted zoning enabling legislation. See
Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs,50 IowA L.
367, 368-69 (1965) (providing an exhaustive survey of zoning enabling
statutes in all fifty states).
6. See 1 P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CoNRoLs § 1.03 (1982); Cunningham, supra note 5, at 405-08. Cunningham suggests that the future of
zoning lies in the regional administration and review of land use controls.
Id. at 414. See also, Cribbet, ChangingConcepts in the Law of Land Use, 50
IOWA L. REV. 245, 277 (1965) (concluding that some form of regional supervision of local land use decisions is a necessity, yet recommending that most
land use decisions remain under local control).
7. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.02 (1975 &
Supp. 1982). Rathkopf observes that the enlarging scope of zoning issues is
a result of the increasing complexity of modern civilization and not merely
a result of recent shifts in population. Id. at 2-19. Some commentators believe the present system of land use controls is inadequate to cope with the
enlarging scope of land use issues. See infra note 13.
REV.
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ture.8 However, as each suburb reaches its capacity for growth,
developable land becomes more scarce and the scope of land
use conflicts gradually expands. Conflicts that once involved
purely local interests now affect extra-local, regional and even
statewide interests. 9 For example, the increased population resulting from the rezoning of a tract of land from single-family to
multi-family dwellings can so overburden an area's infrastructure1 0 that neighboring communities dependent upon the same
facilities are adversely affected;" or the environmental consequences arising from the operation of landfulls are judged so
grave that the state may decide to assume the primary obliga12
tion for their location and regulation.
In answer to the expanding scope of land use conflicts, the
American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code' 3 ad14
vocates a significant restructuring of the local zoning process.
8. Approximately 95% of all land use decisions are of purely local consequence. Fox, A Tentative Guide to the American Law Institute's Proposed
Model Land Development Code, 6 URBAN LAWYER 928, 930 (1974).
9. For the purposes of this comment, the term extra-local refers to an
area outside the borders of the zoning municipality. Hence, a local land use
decision which has an adverse extra-local impact is one which places additional burdens on property outside the borders of the zoning municipality.
10. An area's infrastructure is comprised of those services which form
the basic or underlying physical framework of a community: such as, roads,

sewers, schools and water supply facilities. See
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 941 (2d ed. 1979).

WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL

11. See Forestview Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974). The plaintiffs in Forestview alleged, and
the court agreed, that the rezoning of a single-family tract to accomodate
multi-family apartment houses would have an adverse affect on the area's
roads, sewers, schools and water supply. Id. at 244-47, 309 N.E.2d at 775-76.
See also infra notes 96-105 discussing Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill. 2d 392, 410 N.E.2d 37 (1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981). Barrington Hills and Hoffman Estates have engaged in a
22-year feud regarding industrial development. Hoffman Estates has encouraged industrial development in order to broaden its tax base, while
Barrington Hills has been adamant in its resistance to change. See Chicago
Tribune, Aug. 26, 1983 at 5, col. 1.
12. In 1970 the Illinois legislature enacted the Environmental Protection
Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1001-51 (1981). In its policy statement
accompanying the Act, the legislature noted the necessity for a statewide
program to resolve environmental problems "which do not respect political
boundaries." Id. at § 1002(i). See also County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 513-15, 389 N.E.2d 553, 560 (1979) (Environmental
Protection Act was intended to set mandatory statewide minimum standards for pollution control).

13.

MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE

(proposed Official Draft 1975)

[hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
14. Id. at ix-x. An American Law Institute conference group concluded:
The present legal framework for decision making in the field of land use
planning ... remains a product of the twenties . . . when measured
against the needs and aspirations of an increasingly urban and mobile
society, this framework fails to provide the necessary guidance to local
legislative and administrative bodies, ... courts, . . . and . .. law-
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The Code proposes that the states retain some of their zoning
powers in order to address land use issues of statewide concern. 15 Further, the Code advocates the establishment of a regional authority to deal with regional land use needs and
conflicts, 16 while allowing local zoning bodies to retain exclusive
jurisdiction over issues of essentially local importance.' 7 The
Code also advocates a liberalization of the rules governing
standing to attack and review local land use decisions when
such decisions have extra-local effects.' 8 Few state legislatures,
however, have followed the suggestion outlined in the Model
Code.' 9 Consequently, the courts have been left to resolve the
issues raised by the expanding scope of land use conflicts.
One important issue addressed in these cases is municipal
standing to attack the land use decisions of a neighboring muyers ....
This framework ... is often incompatible with the ... democratic process. This system ... applied by local governments within a
region, tends to disregard the greater interests of the regional community and in many instances fails to recognize and protect valid local
needs.
Id. at viii.
15. Id. at §§ 7-201, 7-204, 7-207. See also Fox, supra note 8, at 940-41.
16. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, at §§ 7-301 to 7-305 and 8-101 to 8-205.
17. Id. at §§ 1-101, 1-102. Under the Code, local zoning bodies are given
the primary authority to zone, but this authority is qualified in two ways.
Id. at § 1-101(1). First, the Code provides a mechanism through which the
state can retain jurisdiction over land use decisions of statewide interest.
Id. at §§ 7-201, 7-204. Areas of statewide interest may include: sites of significant public concern such as environmental and wildlife preserves, or
such inter-community facilities as airports and highway interchanges. See
generally Fox, supra note 8, at 941-42.
Second, the local power to zone is further qualified by provisions for
review of local ordinances which have an impact beyond local boundaries.
MODEL CODE, supra note 13, at § 1-101(3). See also Fox, supra note 8, at 94344. In such cases the Code provides for review of local land use decisions by
a State Land Adjudicatory Board. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, at §§ 7-501 to
7-503. See generally Fox, supra note 8, at 943-48.
18. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, at §§ 7-501 to 7-503. The Code establishes a State Land Adjudicatory Board to review local land use decisions
which have extra-local costs. Under the Code, a local decision which imposes burdens on property beyond the boundaries of the local zoning authority is said to have extra-local costs. Id. at § 7-301.
Standing to obtain review by the State Land Adjudicatory Board is provided to "any person who has a significant interest affected by the [local]
order or rule." Id. at § 9-105(3). See generally Note, Standing to Sue Under
the Model Land Development Code, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 649, 656-57, 665
(1976) (suggesting standing requirements under Model Code be further liberalized by linking code's "significant interest" test to the federal law of
standing).
19. Five states have adopted positions on state retention of zoning powers similar to those found in the Model Code. E.g., FLA. ANN. STAT. § 380.05

(Supp. 1983); VT. ANN. STAT. tit. 10, § 6085(c) (Cumm. Supp. 1982). See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 13, at 284-91.
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nicipality. 20 Recognizing that the effects of local zoning ordinances can spill-over into neighboring municipalities, 21 several
courts have extended standing to neighboring municipalities to
attack local zoning ordinances. 22 This trend has allowed munici20. "Standing" is the "ticket of admission" to judicial review of local
land use decisions. 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 43-1. Illinois courts regard standing as having two main requirements. First, each party must
have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy to assure the
court of the necessary concrete adverseness. Underground Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375-76, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1977); DiSanto v. City of Warrenville, 59 Ill. App. 3d 931, 935, 376 N.E.2d 288, 291
(1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Community Unit School Dist., 44 Ill.
App. 3d 665, 670, 358 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1976). Second, the parties must present
an actual case or controversy for review. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. County of
Cook, 6 Ill. 2d 419, 421-23, 129 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1955); Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App. 3d
721, 725, 437 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1982).
The most efficient analysis of issues raised by standing requirements in
land use conflicts requires an identification of the fundamental interests involved. See 1 N. WILLiAMs, AMERICAN PLANNING LAw 71 (1974). The persons
seeking standing in zoning litigation are generally of two kinds: the "developer" and the "neighbor." Id. at 71-72. In a "developer" case, a property
developer requests the rezoning of a tract of land and the request has been
denied by the local zoning authority. The developer then brings suit
against the zoning authority, alleging the refusal to rezone is an unreasonable restriction of his property rights. Id. at 72. The developer will likely
satisfy the requirements for standing in most jurisdictions because his
property interests have been directly affected by the zoning authority's refusal to rezone. See generally 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at § 43.03.
In a "neighbor" case, the developer is granted his rezoning request and
a neighboring property owner brings suit against the zoning authority. The
neighbor alleges the rezoning is inconsistent with nearby property uses and
therefore is unreasonable and invalid. See 1 N. WILLIAMs, supra, at 71. If
"neighbor" owns property adjacent to the zoned tract then he will also satisfy the requirements for standing in most jurisdictions. Anundson v. City
of Chicago, 44 IMI.2d 491, 495-96, 256 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1970); Bredberg v. City of
Wheaton, 24 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 182 N.E.2d 742, 748 (1962). However, the greater
the distance of the neighbor's property from the zoned tract the less likely it
is that he will satisfy standing requirements. See Garner v. County of
DuPage, 8 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60, 133 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1956); University Square,
Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill. App. 3d 872, 878-79, 392 N.E.2d 136, 140 (1979);
Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co. v. Village of Bartlett, 26 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1025,
325 N.E.2d 412, 415 (1975). See also 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at §§ 43.03.04. See generally Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185 (1980); Parker & Stone,
Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1978); Note, The
"Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 294
(1974).
21. E.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978)
("The imaginary line defining a city's corporate limit cannot corral the influence of municipal actions.") See also infra note 25 and accompanying text.
22. Board of County Comm'rs v. City of Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 610
(Colo. 1981) (same); City of Greely v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 76,
77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (city standing to attack county zoning ordinance);
Village of Claycomo v. City of Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (village standing to attack city zoning ordinance based on village's
allegations of injury to as a landowner); Borough of Allendale v. Township
Comm. of Mahwah, 169 N.J. Super. 34, 404 A.2d 50 (1979) (city standing to
attack neighboring township's zoning ordinance); Stewart v. City of Eu-
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palities to assert direct injury to extra-local interests as a basis
for standing.23 Once a municipality is granted standing to attack
the zoning ordinances of its neighbors, however, a directly related issue arises regarding the appropriate standard of review
to be applied to the ordinance under attack. The courts have
traditionally taken a geographically limited perspective when
testing the validity of zoning ordinances. 24 Such a perspective is
usually limited to an area within several blocks of the zoned
property. The trend in recent zoning decisions, however, is
away from a purely local view and toward a broader perspective
which includes extra-local interests. 25 This broader perspective

considers land use conditions beyond the immediate vicinity of
the zoned property, even if such conditions lie within the bor26
ders of neighboring municipalities.
gene, 57 Or. App. 627, 646 P.2d 74 (1982) (city standing to attack county zoning ordinance); Ruegg v. Board of County Comm'rs, 32 Or. App. 77, 573 P.2d
740 (1978) (city standing to attack county zoning ordinance).
For cases in which the potential for municipal standing was recognized,
see Town of Somerset v. County Council of Montgomery, 229 Md. 42, 181
A.2d 671 (1962) (court implied municipality had standing to attack county
zoning ordinance); Village of Franklin v. City of Southfield, 101 Mich. App.
554, 300 N.W.2d 634 (1981) (court implied city could have standing to attack
neighboring village's ordinance if village alleged and proved special damages). See also Township of River Vale v. Township of Orangetown, 403
F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1968) (municipality was person within fourteenth
amendment and thus had standing to attack zoning ordinance of adjacent
municipality, even though each municipality was in a different state).
23. See cases cited supra note 22.
24. This judicial perspective may be a result of the traditional American
precept that, a landowner has an absolute right to use his property as he
pleases. See Cribbet, supra note 6, at 251-53. See also infra notes 48-60 and
accompanying text discussing the perspective of review used by Illinois
courts.
25. All of the courts which have extended standing to municipalities
representing extra-local interests have also tested the validity of the contested ordinance in the context of extra-local factors and conditions. See
cases cited supra note 22.
26. Perhaps the earliest articulation of a broader perspective of review
for local land use decisions appeared in Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). The Duffcon Products court
stated:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not only on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present and reasonably
prospective, but also on the nature of the entire region in which the
municipality is located and the use to which the land in that region has
been or may be put most advantageously. The effective development of
a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or
even centuries ago, and based in many instances on considerations of
geography, of commerce, or of politics that are no longer significant
with respect to zoning. The direction of growth ... refuses to be governed by such artificial lines. Changes in methods of transportation as
well as in living conditions have served to accentuate the unreality in
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A number of recent Illinois decisions have followed the
trend of extending standing to municipalities to attack the zoning ordinances of other governing bodies. 27 Moreover, these decisions indicate that Illinois courts are gradually moving away
from their traditional use of a purely local perspective of review
dealing with zoning problems on the basis of the territorial limits of a
municipality.
Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50.
Early courts using a broader perspective of review were primarily concerned with the issue of whether industrial development was appropriate
for newly developing residential areas. See id. at 514, 64 A.2d at 351 (finding
industrial development unsuitable for residential community). Cf. City of
Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper, 267 Mich. 603, 607, 255 N.W. 371, 372 (1934) (finding
area dominated by industrial uses was suitable for further development of
industry, rather than residential uses). Recent cases have used the Duffcon
Products rationale as a method of limiting growth. See Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 246-47, 309 N.E.2d 763,
775-76 (1974) (county rezoning for large apartment complex held unreasonable burden on regional water, transport and educational facilities);
Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582 (1972),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972) (not unreasonable for town to refuse rezoning of residential area when property suitable for industrial development
was available in surrounding area). Use of a broader perspective of review
in this way is a method of preserving the status quo through limiting
growth. See Comment, The Regional Welfare Analysis in Zoning Actions:
A Tool to Limit Development?, 12 CoNN. L. REV. 93, 100-05 (1979). See generally Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 515 (1957) (providing a useful overview of the necessity and limitations
of regional planning and zoning).
However, several courts have adopted a broader perspective of the general welfare and invalidated local land use decisions which were inconsistent with conditions existing outside the zoning municipalities. Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975) (township required to provide for low and moderate income
housing, holding based on regional analysis of the general welfare); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y. 2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 672
(1975) (town required to consider regional need for housing and could not
totally forbid construction of multi-family housing). See generally, Recent
Developments, Zoning-JudicialEnforcement of the Duty to Serve the Regional Welfare in Zoning Decisions, 55 WASH. L. REV. 485 (1980). Such a use
of a broader perspective of review reverses the Duffcon Products rationale
because it projects the extra-local needs of a region onto the land use decisions of local zoning authorities, rather than projecting local needs on extralocal interests.
27. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 IlI. 2d
392, 398, 410 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (village
had standing to attack neighboring village's zoning ordinance); City of
Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview, 67 Ill. 2d 399, 402-03, 367 N.E.2d 1305,
1307 (1977) (city had standing to attack village zoning ordinance); City of
West Chicago v. County of DuPage, 67 Ill. App. 3d 924, 925-26, 385 N.E.2d 826,
827 (1979)
(city had standing to attack county zoning ordinance);
Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 111. App. 3d 230,
233, 309 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1974) (village had standing to intervene in suit attacking county zoning ordinance). But see Hinckley-Big Rock School Dist.
v. Village of Sugar Grove, 105 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961-65, 435 N.E.2d 216, 219-21
(1982) (after dismissing plaintiffs suit on other grounds, court went on to
speculate that plaintiff school district could not meet requirements for
standing).
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for local land use decisions. This comment supports the judicial
adoption of a broader perspective of review for local land use
decisions and suggests that the use of a purely local standard of
review would be inconsistent with the recent Illinois decisions
which extend standing to municipalities representing extra-local interests. Further, this comment suggests that various legislative enactments establish an adequate policy and statutory
basis for the judicial adoption of a broader perspective in the
review of local land use decisions which conflict with extra-local
interests.
THE FRAMEWORK FOR ILLINOIS ZONING

The general principle recognized in all jurisdictions is that
local municipalities do not have an inherent zoning power. 28 A
local government's power to zone is derived from the state's police power. 29 However, the specific statutory or constitutional
grant of the zoning power varies from state to state. 30 Under the
1970 Illinois Constitution, certain municipalities are designated
home rule units 31 and derive their power to zone directly from
the constitution.3 2 The non-home rule power to zone is exclusively statutory.33 Both home rule and non-home rule powers
may be limited by state legislative action. 34 Legislative limita28. People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton
Grove, 16 Ill. 2d 183, 188, 157 N.E.2d 33, 35 (1959); 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW
AND PRACTICE § 3-4 (4th ed. 1978); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 3.02 (1968).
29. County of Cook v. Priester, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 367-68, 342 N.E.2d 41, 46
(1976); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 Ill. 2d 77, 85, 241
N.E.2d 454, 459 (1968); 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 28, at §§ 3.04-3.07; 1 E.
YOKLEY, supra note 28, at §§ 3-4, 3-5.
30. 1 E. YOKLEY, supra note 28, at § 3-5.
31. IIL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a). Counties and municipalities with a population in excess of 25,000 are automatically designated home rule units. Id. A
municipality with a population less than 25,000 may elect to become a home
rule unit. Id. Any home rule unit may, by referendum, reject its designation as a home rule unit. Id. at § 6(b).
32. Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 96 Ill. App. 3d 561,
569, 421 N.E.2d 285, 292 (1981); City of Champaign v. Kroger Co., 88 Ill. App.
3d 498, 510-11, 410 N.E.2d 661, 671 (1980); Scandroli v. City of Rockford, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 999, 1002-03, 408 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1980).
The home rule power to zone extraterritorially does not derive from the
constitution, but must be provided by statute. City of Carbondale v. Van
Natta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 487-89, 338 N.E.2d 19, 21-23 (1975). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
24, § 11-13-1(1) (1981) (statutory extension and limitation of zoning up to
one and one-half miles beyond municipal boundaries). See generally Hug,
ExtraterritorialPowers of Illinois Municipalitiesand the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 69 ILL. B.J. 32, (1980).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1981) (municipal zoning enabling
act); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1981) (county zoning enabling act).
34. Home rule powers may be limited by legislative action in conformance with the constitution. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(g), (h), (i), (1). See infra
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tions on home rule powers, however, must conform to certain
constitutional requirements. 3 5
Although the constitutional
grant of home rule power is broader than that of the zoning enabling statutes, 36 the factors applied in testing the validity of local zoning ordinances are the same, regardless of the statutory
37
or constitutional basis for the ordinance.
The appropriate procedure for judicial review of a local land
use decision is dependent upon the capacity in which the local
governing body was acting when it made the decision. Judicial
review of administrative land use decisions made by the local
board of zoning appeals is governed by the Administrative Review Act. 38 Review of land use decisions which are legislative or
quasi-legislative in character are by trial de novo in the circuit
39

courts.

Standing to obtain judicial review of local administrative decisions is limited to persons who were both a party to the adminnote 35. The non-home rule power to zone is subject to the limitations pro-

vided in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-2 to 11-13-15 (1981). See also, Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule in the Courts, 63 ILL. B.J. 320 (1975).
35. The state legislature may limit home rule powers by a three-fifths
vote of both houses. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(g), (1). The legislature may preempt a local home rule power by enacting a statute which "specifically" provides for exclusive exercise of the power by the state. Id. at § 6(h). Home
rule units may concurrently exercise any power which the state has not
"specifically" preempted. Id. at § 6 (i). County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 513-15, 389 N.E.2d 553, 560 (1979) (holding that
legislature's establishment of statewide environmental standards was intended to preempt home rule power to set such minimum standards).
36. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a) provides that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and
affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection
of the public health, safety, morals and welfare." Id. The zoning enabling
statutes, on the other hand, provide a broad but finite range of purposes for
which non-home rule units may zone. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1981).
One court has used the broad grant of home rule powers as a basis for finding standing for home rule units in zoning actions. See infra notes 70-83 and
accompanying text. More recently the distinction between home rule and
non-home rule powers has become important in the area of state preemption of local zoning powers. See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors
Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 513-15, 389 N.E.2d 553, 560 (1979). See generally Note,
County of Cook v. John Sexton ContractorsCo.: Home Rule Triumphs Over
Uniform Regulation of Sanitary Landfills, 1979 So. IL. U. L.J. 347.
37. For a discussion of the factors relevant in testing the validity of a
zoning ordinance, see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-13 (1981). The Administrative Review
Act confines judicial review of administrative decisions to the record of the
administrative proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 264 (1981). See also,
Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 411 Ill. 559, 104 N.E.2d 612
(1952).
39. See People ex rel. Joseph Lumber Co. v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 321,
329-30, 83 N.E.2d 592, 597 (1949); Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 96 Ill. App. 3d 561, 575-76, 421 N.E.2d 285, 297 (1981).
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istrative proceeding and were aggrieved by its decision.4° A
party attacking the validity of a local legislative land use decision need only show that he is aggrieved by that decision.4 1 Regardless of the legislative or administrative character of the
decision, the test for the necessary degree of aggrievement is
the same. 42 The test is whether the party seeking relief has sufinterfered or will suffer direct and adverse effects to a property
43
ordinance.
zoning
contested
the
of
est as a result
The contestant of a zoning ordinance has the burden of
proving that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 44 To sustain his burden of proof the contestant must over45
The
come a presumption in favor of the ordinance's validity.

contestant's burden is not sustained by proof that the "wisdom,
necessity or expediency" 46 of the ordinance is debatable. 47 Instead, the contestant of a zoning ordinance must show that the
ordinance is unreasonable because it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety or welfare. 48 The courts have
devised a litany of factors as an aid in determining the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance. The Illinois Supreme Court, in
40. Williams v. Department of Labor, 76 Ill.2d 72, 79, 389 N.E.2d 1177,
1180 (1979). A party is "aggrieved" when his pecuniary or property rights
are directly affected. BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 60 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
41. See cases cited supra note 27.
42. See 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at § 43.01. There appears to be no
reason to distinguish the standing requirements for parties who originated
their contest before a local zoning board of appeals and those who originally
brought an action in a circuit court. Id. at 43-2.
2d
43. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill.
392, 397-98, 410 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (test for
municipal standing is whether municipality has or will suffer direct adverse
2d 491,
affects in its corporate capacity); Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill.
495-96, 256 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1970) (test for individual standing is whether individual has or will suffer direct injury to a property interest). See generally 3
A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at § 43.01.
44. Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104, 111, 133 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1956);
App. 2d 437, 442, 231 N.E.2d 706, 708
Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 Ill.
(1967).
The contestant of a zoning ordinance must sustain his burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence. E.g., Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines, 64
Ill. 2d, 172, 179-80, 354 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1976); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v.
App. 3d 421, 425-26, 389 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1979).
County of Lake, 71 Ill.
45. County of Cook v. Priester, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 368, 342 N.E.2d 41, 46 (1976);
Mid-West Emery Freight Sys., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. App. 2d 425,
435, 257 N.E.2d 127, 132 (1970).
2d 111, 115, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831
46. City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill.
(1979).

47. Grobman v. City of Des Plaines, 59 Ill. 2d 588, 593, 322 N.E.2d 443, 446
(1975); Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104, 107, 133 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1956).
48. County of Cook v. Priester, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 368, 342 N.E.2d 41, 46 (1976);
Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lake, 71 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 389
N.E.2d 882, 885 (1979).
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LaSalle NationalBank v. County of Cook,49 announced the following factors as significant:
1) the existing uses of nearby property;
2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning ordinance;
3) the extent to which the destruction of the property values of
the contestant promotes the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public;
4) the relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner;
5) the suitability of the zoned property for the zoned purposes;
6) the length of time the property has remained vacant as zoned,
considered in the context of land
50 development in the area in the
vicinity of the subject property.
Subsequent case law has resulted in two additional factors of
significance:
7) the public need for the proposed use; 51 and
8) the thoroughness
with which the legislative body planned and
52
zoned the land use.
Although none of the listed factors standing alone can serve
to invalidate a zoning ordinance, 53 the courts are in substantial
agreement on the method of their application. 54 First, application of the LaSalle test requires that all the factors be considered in the context of the specific facts in each case. 55 Second,
the courts have consistently given the greatest weight to the first
49. 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
50. Id. at 46-47, 145 N.E.2d at 69.
51. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 378,
167 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1960).
52. Id. at 378, 167 N.E.2d at 411. See also Parkway Bank &Trust Co. v.
County of Lake, 71 111. App. 3d 421, 426, 389 N.E.2d 882, 886 (1979).
53. Virtually every Illinois zoning case cites this truism after listing the
LaSalle National Bank factors. E.g., LaGrange State Bank v. County of
Cook, 75 Ill. 2d 301, 308, 388 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1979).
54. See generally 1 N. WriuAms, supra note 20, at § 6.17. The Illinois
courts have gained a reputation as being relatively conservative on issues of
zoning and planning. Id. at 145-46. Williams suggests that such a reputation
is a result of a "reasonably consistent. . . hostility towards zoning" by the
courts. Id. at 147. While this view appears to be consistent with the Illinois
courts' strict adherence to the LaSalle National Bank analysis and the
courts' willingness to protect the residential character of zoned areas, such
a view appears to be inconsistent with recent trends in Illinois land use law.
Compare infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text (discussing recent Illinois standing cases) and 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 43-47 (suggesting
Illinois has become one of the most liberal jurisdictions in extending standing to municipalities) with 1 N. WiLLAms, supra note 20, at 147 (suggesting
Illinois courts are conservative and developer oriented in land use matters).
55. Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104, 107, 133 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1956);
Kellet v. County of DuPage, 89 Ill. App. 2d 437, 442, 231 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1967).
See also 1 N. WnuMvls, supra note 20, at 146-47 (noting the intense factual
analysis used by Illinois courts in applying the LaSalle National Bank

factors).
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factor, the uses of nearby property. In analyzing the nearby
uses, however, the courts have been content to limit their examination to a relatively small geographical area.56 In a few rare
cases though, the courts have allowed into evidence the character of property beyond the immediate vicinity of the zoned
tract. 57 Thus, the general rule appears to be that "nearby" prop-

erty means "neighboring" property within several blocks of the
zoned tract.

58

A similar geographically limited perspective is utilized in
applying the remaining LaSalle factors. For example, in applying the third 59 and fourth 60 LaSalle factors, the courts have limited their perspective to purely local elements. These factors
have been used as a balancing device in which "the gain to the
public is ... compared with the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner."'6 1 Moreover, in defining the term
"public" the courts have taken a similarly narrow perspective,
confining the meaning of the term to the immediate area of the
56. Pioneer Trust &Say. Bank v. Village of Oak Park, 408 Ill.
458, 459-62,
97 N.E.2d 302, 303-04 (1951) (court considered area within several blocks of
zoned property); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 167-71, 180 N.E. 767, 771-72
(1932) (same); Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 96 Ill.
App. 3d 561, 578-79, 421 N.E.2d 285, 299 (1981) (court considered property up
to one-half mile from zoned tract); Amalgamated Trust & Say. Bank v.
County of Cook, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 370, 372-75, 402 N.E.2d 719, 722-24 (1980) (court
considered property adjacent to and across street from zoned tract); MidWest Emery Freight Sys., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill.
App. 2d 425, 429-34,
257 N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (1970) (same).
57. County of Cook v. Priester, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 363-67, 342 N.E.2d 41, 44-46
(1976) (court considered property in airport flight path on issue of limits on
allowable aircraft landing weights); Gordon v. City of Wheaton, 12 Ill.
2d 284,
288, 146 N.E.2d 37, 39-40 (1957) (evidence of land uses two miles away on
issue of proper zoning for undeveloped area was of little probative value,
but did not mislead jury); Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 Ill.
2d 28, 32-35,
115 N.E.2d 315, 316-18 (1953) (evidence of industrial development up to one
mile from zoned site used to emphasize unsuitability of area for residential
use); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of Palatine, 92 Ill.
App. 2d 327, 329-31, 236
N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (1968) (because property surrounding zoned tract was undeveloped, court considered area up to two miles from zoned tract).
58. See cases cited supra note 56.
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
60. See id.
61. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 Ill.
2d 77, 85, 241
N.E.2d 454, 459 (1968). See also LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook, 75
Ill. 2d 301, 309, 388 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1979) (loss to property owner resulting
from zoning ordinance only significant when public welfare does not require such an ordinance); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lake, 71
Ill. App. 3d 421, 424-25, 389 N.E.2d 882, 886 (1979) (property owner must show
loss in value of his property is not balanced by benefit to public); Mid-West
Emery Freight Sys., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill.
App. 2d 425, 442, 257
N.E.2d 127, 137 (1970) (issue is whether benefit to public justifies loss in
value of owner's property).
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zoned property or the boundaries of the zoning municipality. 62
The practical result of using the LaSalle test is to give the
courts wide discretion over an essentially factual analysis of
each specific zoning conflict. 63 Although the test works well in
the most common kinds of zoning conflicts, where both parties
represent local interests, 64 the test has major inadequacies
when one of the parties alleges that a local zoning ordinance violates an extra-local interest. In these cases, continued reliance
on wholly local facts and conditions as a yardstick of an ordinance's reasonableness addresses only part of the issue
presented for review.
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL

STANDING

A cursory examination of the recent Illinois decisions extending standing to neighboring municipalities suggests that Illinois courts are expanding the spectrum of interests they will
allow to be represented in zoning conflicts. A careful examination of these cases, however, suggests that in addition to allowing the representation of a broader range of interests in
zoning conflicts, the courts are signaling that they will take a
broader perspective in reviewing the validity of local land use
decisions. 65 By all indications this broader perspective will in66
clude extra-local factors and interests.
The theory that the recent line of Illinois standing cases indicates a trend toward a broader perspective of review rests on
three observations. First, throughout these standing cases the
62. See cases cited supra note 50. But see County of Cook v. Priester, 62
Ill. 2d 357, 363-64, 342 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (1976) (court considered national need
for intermediate service airports as a basis for its decision).
63. See 1 N. WLIAMS, supra note 20, at 146.
64. Id. at § 2.01. According to Williams, the two most common kinds of
zoning litigation can be broadly categorized as "developer" and "neighbor"
conflicts. See supra note 20 for a discussion of "developer" and "neighbor"
conflicts in the context of standing to sue.
65. See supra note 25 for a discussion of how other jurisdictions have
applied a broader perspective of review to land use conflicts between local
and extra-local interests. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at
§ 43.08; 3 N. WLIAMs, supra note 20, at § 66.12(c) (Supp. 1982).
66. Extra-local factors and interests recognized in other jurisdictions include: water and sewer services, multi-family and low income housing,
preservation of a community's residential character, and preservation of
aesthetic and environmental values. See generally Note, The Regional Welfare Analysis in Zoning Actions. A Tool to Limit Development, 12 CoNN. L.
REV. 93 (1979); Note, A Regional Perspective of the General Welfare, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1227 (1977); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 108; Note, The Duty of a Municipality to Consider
the EnvironmentalEffect of its Land Use Planning Decisions Upon the Regional Welfare: Judicial Balancing in the Absence of Interjurisdictional
PlanningLegislation, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1253 (1979).
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Illinois Supreme Court has formulated a broad test for municipal standing. 67 Second, the court has refused to accept a narrow
reading of the requirements for municipal standing. 68 Third, the
continued use of a purely local perspective 69 in the review of
land use decisions which conflict with extra-local interests is inconsistent with the courts' extension of standing to parties rep70
resenting extra-local interests.
The first case which held a neighboring municipality had
standing to attack another municipality's land use decision was
Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook.71 Prior
to Forestview, Illinois courts regularly held that a neighboring
municipality did not have standing to attack the legislapve or
administrative land use decisions of its neighbors. 72 These holdings were predicated on the rationale of Dillon's rule 73 which
viewed local government bodies as mere statutory creations of
the state. 74 As such, a municipality could only exercise powers
75
which were specifically or impliedly granted to it by statute.
Therefore, since the legislature had not granted a general municipal power to sue in zoning matters, and none could be implied, the municipalities were without standing. 76 The court in
Forestview, however, viewed the broad grant of home rule powers in the 1970 Illinois Constitution7 7 as taking home rule units
78
outside the restrictions of Dillon's rule.
In Forestview, a developer sought the rezoning of a tract of
land located in unincorporated Cook County. 79 The county re67. See infra notes 71-106 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
factors used by Illinois courts in testing the validity of local zoning
ordinances.
70. For a discussion of the inconsistency between the extension of
standing based on extra-local factors and the review of zoning conflicts
based on purely local factors, see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
See also infra notes 107-15 for a discussion of the statutory and policy bases

for adoption of a broader perspective of review.

71. 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 236-38, 309 N.E.2d 763, 768-69 (1974).

72. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. County of Cook, 31 11l. App. 3d
213, 214-15, 278 N.E.2d 841, 842 (1971); Village of Arlington Heights v. County
of Cook, 133 Ill. App. 2d 673, 675-77, 273 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1971); Krembs v.
County of Cook, 121 Ill. App. 2d 148, 257 N.E.2d 120 (1970).
73. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (1911).
74. Id. See, e.g., Ives v. City of Chicago, 3011. 2d 582, 584, 198 N.E.2d 518,
519 (1964).
75. See cases cited supra note 72.
76. See cases cited supra note 72.
77. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a). See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying

text for a discussion of home rule powers under the Illinois constitution.

78. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 1. App. 3d

230, 240-41, 309 N.E.2d 763, 768-69 (1974).
79. Id. at 235, 309 N.E.2d at 766.
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zoned the land from single family to multi-family residences.
The developer then proceeded with plans to build a 2,500 unit
apartment complex. The Village of Northbrook sought to intervene in an action brought by private homeowner associations
against the developer. 80 The village argued that increased population resulting from the proposed apartment complex would
overburden the area's education, sanitary and transportation facilities. 8 ' In finding that the village had standing, the appellate
court relied on the village's home rule powers in combination
with its general municipal power to sue in equity for the protection of public rights grounded in municipal ordinances. 82 Essentially the court reasoned that a municipality is acting in a
governmental capacity when it enters into litigation to enforce
public policies grounded in its ordinances. Because such litiga83
tion necessarily pertains to its "government and affairs,"
standing to sue falls within the broad grant of Article VII home
84
rule powers.
Implicit in this rationale is the recognition that the village
had a substantial interest in the continued vitality of the area's
infrastructure. The Forestview decision suggests that municipal
allegations of injury to an extra-local interest will satisfy standing requirements, but only if the municipality can allege a connection between such an interest and a municipal policy
grounded in an official ordinance. The Forestview rationale
therefore extends standing to home rule units whenever their
official policies implicate an extra-local interest. Although the
Forestview decision represented a liberalization of municipal
standing requirements, the practical effect of the decision was to
restrict standing to a relatively small number of Illinois munici80. Id. at 236, 309 N.E.2d at 768. The Village sought to intervene under
ch. 110, § 1(2) (b) (1981) which provides: "upon timely application anyone may in the discretion of the court be permitted to intervene
in an action ... (b) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common." Id.
81. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill.
App. 3d
ILL. REV. STAT.

230, 240, 309 N.E.2d 763, 775 (1974). See supra notes 30-35 discussing home

rule powers. In the absence of a statutory prohibition, a municipality may
seek injunctive relief for the protection of public rights. See Chicago, Burlington &Quincy R.R. Co. v. Quincy, 136 l.489, 493, 27 N.E. 232, 233 (1891); 17
McQUILLEN, THE LAw OF MuNcrPMAL CORPORATIONS § 49.57 (3rd ed. 1982).

82. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 1ll.
App. 3d
230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974).
83. Home rule units are permitted to exercise any power and perform
any function pertaining to their government and affairs. ILL. CONST. art. 7,
§ 6(a).
84. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 I. App. 3d
230, 237, 309 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1974).
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palities.85 The basis for municipal standing in Forestview was
premised on a home rule unit's constitutional power to act on
matters within its government and affairs. The decision therefore did not affect the majority of local governments which were
not home rule units. Consequently, without a statutory grant of
standing, non-home rule municipalities remained under the restrictions of Dillon's rule.8 6
In two later decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court accepted
the Forestview result but implicitly rejected its restrictive rationale. In City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview,87 the
court accepted the rule that an "'aggrieved person' with a real
interest in the subject matter of the controversy may challenge a
zoning ordinance."88 The facts indicated that Hickory Hills was
required by a prior judgment to provide water and sewer services to a geographically isolated section of Bridgeview. Hickory
Hills supplied services to the tract but objected when Bridgeview rezoned the area for single-family residences. 8 9 Hickory
Hills challenged the validity of the rezoning, alleging that the
development of single-family residences would require it to
make large expenditures to supply the area with sanitary hookups. In concluding that Hickory Hills had standing to challenge
the rezoning, the court noted that a city would necessarily have
a "real interest" in a land use decision which tended to increase
its obligation under a prior court order.9 0
The significance of the Hickory Hills decision lies in what
the court did not decide. Although the Hickory Hills court cited
Forestview with approval, the court did not adopt the
Forestview rationale that conditioned standing on a municipal85. In 1982, only 102 of approximately 1,050 municipalities in northeastern Illinois were home rule units. Therefore, the Forestview rule for standing would have precluded a sizeable majority of municipalities from
satisfying standing requirements to contest the validity of their neighbor's
zoning ordinances. Interview with Mr. Max Dieber, Director of Research of
the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (March 2, 1983).
86. 1

DILLON,

MUNCIPAL CORPORATIONs 488 (1911).

Dillon's rule re-

stricts municipalities to the exercise of those powers which are specifically
or impliedly granted to them by the state legislature. See supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
87. 67 Ill. 2d 399, 367 N.E.2d 1305 (1977).
88. Id. at 403, 367 N.E.2d at 1307.
89. Id. at 400, 367 N.E.2d at 1306.
90. Id. at 403, 367 N.E.2d at 1307. Instead of using Forestview as a basis
for its holding, the court cited Annot. 49 A.L.R.3d 1126 (1973), which lists
cases from other jurisdictions extending standing to municipalities under a
more liberal rationale. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the more liberal requirements for municipal standing in foreign jurisdictions.
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ity's status as a home rule unit.9 1 Instead, the court equated municipal standing with the traditional test for the standing of real
persons, viz, direct injury to a property interest. 92 The lasting
impact of Hickory Hills has been to lift the home rule condition
to standing imposed by Forestview and extend the capacity to
attack land use decisions to all Illinois municipalities. However,
the broad implications of the holding in Hickory Hills initially
caused a division among the appellate courts. One court viewed
Hickory Hills as establishing the general standard for municipal
standing, while another viewed the decision as an exception to
the general rule that municipalities do not have standing to attack the zoning ordinances of other co-equal municipalities.
In City of West Chicago v. County of Du Page,93 the Appellate Court for the Second District concluded that the "aggrieved
person" rule stated in Hickory Hills was generally applicable to
muncipalities.94 There West Chicago contested the validity of a
special use permit granted by Du Page County for the construction of a garage and office complex within one and one-half miles
of the city. In concluding that West Chicago had standing, the
court insisted that the clear implication of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Hickory Hills was that any municipality had
the capacity to contest the validity of another governing body's
zoning ordinance. 95
The Appellate Court for the First District, on the other hand,
took an entirely different position in Village of BarringtonHills
v. Village of Hoffman Estates.96 There Hoffman Estates had annexed and rezoned a tract of land near Barrington Hills. The
rezoning of the tract permitted the construction of an open air
music theatre. Barrington Hills contested the validity of the
Hoffman Estates rezoning ordinance, alleging that the rezoning
97
was inconsistent with the trend in development of the area.
In concluding that Barrington Hills did not have standing,
the appellate court attempted to distinguish the extension of
municipal standing in Forestview and Hickory Hills. According
to the appellate court, a fundamental difference existed between
91. A restriction of standing to attack land use decisions to only those
municipalities which qualified as home rule units would have given the
larger home rule units a disproportionate influence in controlling regional
development. See supra note 85.

92. See supra notes 39-42.
93. 67 111. App. 3d 924, 385 N.E.2d 826 (1979).
94. Id. at 926, 385 N.E.2d at 827.
95. Id.
96. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 75 l. App.
3d 461, 394 N.E.2d 599 (1979), rev'd, 81 Ill.
2d 392, 410 N.E.2d 37 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
97. Id. at 463, 394 N.E.2d at 601.
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the municipal attack of a county zoning ordinance in Forestview
and the municipal attack of a co-equal municipality's zoning ordinance in the present case. 98 Consequently, the appellate court
viewed Hickory Hills as an exception to the general rule that
municipalities did not have standing to attack the zoning ordinances of a co-equal municipality. 99 As perceived by the first
district, the "aggrieved person" exception in Hickory Hills could
apply only if the contesting municipality was under a legal obligation to furnish services to the zoning municipality. Therefore,
since Barrington Hills was not obligated to furnish services to
Hoffman Estates, the Hickory Hills exception clearly did not apply. As support for its decision the court articulated a localist
rationale:
In the development of suburban areas, with municipalities adjoining and contiguous one to another, the boundary lines must start
and stop at some point. The rights and powers of each municipality
must be paramount and superior to adjoining municipalities.
Otherwise the mischievous activities of one municipality could
hold in hostage
the governmental functions of another
00
municipality.'
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the first district's "unduly narrow reading of Hickory Hills."'0 ' The court reaffirmed
its position that municipal standing is predicated on allegations
which demonstrate the contesting municipality will suffer direct
injury as a result of the contested ordinance. 10 2 The court found
the special damages alleged by Barrington Hills (lost revenues,
98. Id. at 466-67, 394 N.E.2d at 602-03. The court viewed Forestview as
establishing the rule for municipal standing in cases where a municipality
was attacking a county zoning ordinance. Id. According to the court, such a
rule was permissible because the Illinois zoning enabling statutes established a priority for municipal zoning over county zoning. Id. See supra
notes 27-36 discussing the mechanics of Illinois zoning. This novel view of
the hierarchy of Illinois municipal law was not addressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court in its review of the appellate court's decision. See Village of
Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill. 2d 392, 410 N.E.2d 37
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).

99. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 75 Ill. App.
3d 461,467, 394 N.E.2d 599, 603 (1979), rev'd, 81111. 2d 392, 410 N.E.2d 37 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
100. Id. at 466, 394 N.E.2d at 603. During periods of rapid growth and development, the appellate court's rationale appears to place an inordinate
value on absolute local autonomy. See supra note 26. Notwithstanding the

fact that such a rationale has received severe criticism for over three decades, is the fact that absolute local autonomy is inherently undemocratic
and, most likely, self-defeating. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying
text discussing the American Law Institute's MODEL CODE. See also supra
note 26.
101. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill. 2d
392, 396, 410 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
102. Id. at 397, 410 N.E.2d at 40. The court further clarified the requirements for municipal standing by stating that a municipality must demonstrate "that it would be substantially, directly and adversely affected in its
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increased expenditures and environmental damages resulting
from air and noise pollution) 10 3 from construction of the
planned open air music theatre in Hoffman Estates were suffi10 4
cient to satisfy the requirements for standing.
The specific allegations which the court accepted in Barrington Hills, when viewed in conjunction with the court's prior decisions, is evidence that the court is shifting toward an extralocal perspective. Since Forestview, the court has had several
opportunities to narrow the requirements for municipal standing. 10 5 Instead, at each opportunity, the court has liberalized
municipal standing requirements and has thus provided municipalities representing extra-local interests access to the judicial
forum. Considering this recent liberalization it would be anomalous for the court to take several steps backward by using a
purely local perspective in the review of conflicts between local
land use decisions and extra-local interests. This is especially
true in light of the national trend toward a broader perspective
10 6
in the review of such conflicts.
Moreover, use of a purely local perspective in such cases
would needlessly add confusion and complexity to land use litigation. Municipalities attacking another governing body's zoning ordinances would be required to satisfy two sets of
unrelated requirements.
First, the contesting municipality
would be required to allege direct injury to an extra-local interest to satisfy standing requirements. Second, the contesting
municipality would be required to prove the invalidity of the local ordinance on the basis of wholly local factors. Such separate
and unrelated requirements for standing and testing the validity
of the contested ordinance avoids addressing the injury upon
which the contesting municipality was originally granted standing. These problems are avoided when a court assumes a
broader perspective and frankly addresses the issue of the local
corporate capacity" by the contested zoning ordinance. Id. at 398, 410
N.E.2d at 40.
103. Id. at 395-96, 410 N.E.2d at 39. Barrington Hills alleged that operation
of the planned open air music theatre (Poplar Creek) in Hoffman Estates
would cause traffic congestion. In turn, the village would be required to
spend $42,000 for additional police to control such traffic and disorderly con-

duct by patrons of the theatre. Id. at 395, 410 N.E.2d at 39. Further, the
village alleged that it would be required to expend additional monies to
clean up the litter and debris deposited along the roads by patrons entering

and leaving the theatre. Id. at 396, 410 N.E.2d at 39. In addition, the village
claimed that fumes from passing autos and sound levels from the live entertainment planned for the theatre would result in decreased property values within the village and thus cause a decline in property tax revenue. Id.
104. Id. at 398, 410 N.E.2d at 40.
105, See supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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ordinance's validity in the context of the injury to the extra-local
interest.
STATUTORY AND

PoLicY

BASES FOR A BROADER

PERSPECTIVE OF REVIEW

The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides a broad policy statement in favor of intermunicipal cooperation. 10 7 Similarly, provisions in the county zoning enabling act' 0 8 implicitly recognize
municipal interests in county land use decisions which affect
property near municipal borders. Under the county zoning enabling act, a municipality is entitled to protest all county zoning
ordinances which affect property within one and one-half miles
of the municipality's borders. 10 9 Any county ordinance subject
to such a protest may be passed only by an extraordinary majority of the county board." 0 This legislative recognition of a municipality's interest in the zoning of property outside its borders
represents a legislative understanding that county land use decisions must be considered in the context of extra-local municipal interests.
Further, the legislature provided another method of intermunicipal cooperation with its enactment of the Northeastern"' and Southwestern Illinois Metropolitan and Regional
Planning Acts." 2 The Acts establish two planning commissions
107. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 10(c) provides: 'The State shall encourage intergovernmental cooperation and use its ... resources to assist intergovernmental activities." Id. Section 10(c) was intended to remove any prior
statutory or constitutional obstructions to intergovernmental cooperation.
Village of Elmwood Park v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 21 Ill.
App. 3d 597, 316 N.E.2d 140 (1974) (section 10 intended to encourage intergovernmental cooperation and remove restrictions of Dillon's rule); RECORD
OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUIONAL CONVENTION, Vol. VII, at
1750-52 (1970) (same). See generally Hall &Wallack, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Transfer of Powers, 1981 U.ILL. L. REV. 775.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3151, 3162 (1981).
109. Id. at § 3152(2). The contesting municipality is entitled to appear at
a hearing before the county zoning board and submit alternatives to the
board's proposed ordinance. Id.
110. If the alternatives suggested by the contesting municipality are not
incorporated within the final draft of the proposed ordinance, then the
county board is required to pass the proposal by a three-quarters vote of all
members. Id.
Because the board is elected from the entire county, the procedure outlined in section 2 of the county zoning enabling Act allows a municipality to
exert a degree of political pressure in opposing the county ordinance. See
City of Canton v. County of Fulton, 11 Ill.
App. 3d 171, 175-76, 296 N.E.2d 97,
100 (1973) (city with one-third population of county could have prevented
enactment of county zoning ordinance by negative vote of its own representatives on county board).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1101 to 1139 (1981).
112. Id., §§ 1151 to 1189.

19841

Municipal Standing

to assess regional needs" 3 and to prepare and adopt a regional
plan of development." 4 The regional plan is made available to
local governing authorities in an advisory capacity." 5 But, even
though the plan is advisory, the legislature clearly recognized
the necessity for maintaining a geographically broad perspective regarding development
of the northeastern and southwest6
ern regions of Illinois."
The use of a purely local perspective in reviewing conflicts
between local land use decisions and extra-local interests is inconsistent with these constitutional and legislative policies.
Such a perspective does not foster intermunicipal cooperation
and planning but only serves to protect and insulate local land
use decisions from consideration in a broader context. Thus far,
Illinois courts have rejected a narrow perspective on issues of
municipal standing, but the courts need to go further in order to
implement these legislative and constitutional policies. By judicially adopting a broader perspective of review which includes
extra-local interests, the courts can promote intermunicipal cooperation and planning.
CONCLUSION

The extension of standing to municipalities representing extra-local interests in land use conflicts is a recognition that local
land use decisions can have significant extra-local effects. Further, the extension of such standing is the first step toward requiring local zoning authorities to adequately consider the
wider implications of their land use decisions. The Illinois
courts have taken the first step toward insuring the representation of extra-local interests in land use conflicts. But the extension of standing to neighboring municipalities will prove
meaningless unless the courts also adopt a broader perspective
of review for local land use decisions.
113. Id., §§ 1119, 1125, 1169, 1179. Both commissions are required to research and make available data regarding population trends, and social,
economic, physical, aesthetic and governmental factors affecting development of the areas they represent. Id.
114. Id., §§ 1121 to 1128, and §§ 1171 to 1182.
115. Id., §§ 1120, 1170.

116. Id., §§ 1102, 1152. The legislature's statement of policy provides:
It is determined and declared by the General Assembly that the welfare, health, prosperity, moral and general well-being of all the people
of this State are, in a large measure, dependent upon the sound and
orderly development of the northeastern [and southwestern] Illinois
counties area. In order to provide for such development it is essential
that a sound and comprehensive general plan for such area be devised
to guide and coordinate. . . development.

Id. at § 1102.
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The current pattern of metropolitan growth and development has created a series of interdependencies among neighboring municipalities." 7 Regional services such as highways, water
lines, and sanitary districts serve neighboring municipalities
over large areas. Business and residential districts often spread
over municipal boundaries and make one village indistinguishable from the next." 8 To allow an individual municipality the
total freedom to make land use decisions without consideration
of the extra-local impact would disregard the municipality's relationship with the metropolitan area which surrounds it." 9
Similarly, a purely local perspective of judicial review for local land use decisions would, in effect, treat each municipality in
isolation and without regard for its relationship to the larger
metropolitan area. A broader perspective of review places local
land use decisions in a more realistic context. Such a perspective is a flexible approach to the review of land use issues which
range from purely local significance to matters of statewide concern. Zoning and planning provide a rational basis for the land
use decision making process. In order to preserve that rational
basis, the courts can no longer afford to ignore the extra-local
effects of local land use decisions.
Timothy R. Karaskiewicz

117.

NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING COMMISSION, REGIONAL LAND USE

PoLIcY PLAN § 5.06 (1978).
118. See supra note 26.
119. The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission advocates greater
use of the municipal power to make intermunicipal compacts as a method
of dealing with local land use decisions which are likely to have an extralocal impact. See NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING COMMISSION, REGIONAL
LAND USE PoLicY PLAN § 5.06 (b), (d). See also supra note 107.

